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THE INTRA-INDUSTRY EFFECTS OF CHAPTER 11 FILINGS: 
EVIDENCE FROM ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECAST 
REVISIONS 
 
Gary L. Caton*, Jeffrey Donaldson**, Jeremy Goh*** 
 
Abstract 
 
Shareholders suffer huge losses when firms they own file Chapter 11. Interestingly, even shareholders 
of rival companies experience statistically significant losses. We examine how the bad news associated 
with a bankruptcy filing is transferred to the filing firm's rivals. Using revisions in analysts' earnings 
forecasts as a proxy for changes in expected future cash flows, we find that after a bankruptcy filing the 
market revises downward its cash flow expectations for rivals. Regression analysis confirms a positive 
relation between changes in expected cash flow and stock market reactions. These findings are 
consistent with our hypothesis that bad news associated with bankruptcy filings are transferred to 
rivals through reductions in expected future cash flows. 
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Introduction 
 
Previous studies reveal that the market discounts the 
wealth of shareholders upon the announcement of a 
bankruptcy filing. For instance, Bradley and 
Rosenzweig (1992) report significant abnormal 
returns of -24.34% for a five-day period surrounding 
Chapter 11 filings. Lang and Stulz (1992) examine the 
effect of bankruptcy filings on the rivals of filing 
companies. They hypothesize that information 
contained in announcements of bankruptcy filings 
may have positive or negative implications for rivals 
and coin the term competitive effect to describe the 
former and contagion effect to describe the latter. 
Specifically, the competitive effect occurs if the 
bankruptcy indicates a weakness in the filing 
company alone that can be exploited for the 
competitive benefit of its rivals. Equity values of 
rivals gaining this competitive benefit are expected to 
react positively. On the other hand, the contagion 
effect occurs if the bankruptcy filing indicates an 
industry wide weakness that may spread like a 
contagion to rivals because of their similar cash flow 
characteristics. Equity values of rivals catching a 
financial virus are expected to react negatively to 
bankruptcy filings. Lang and Stulz's primary finding 
is that bankruptcy announcements decrease the value 
of a portfolio comprised of the equity of rival 
companies by 1 percent on average, and conclude that 
contagion effects dominate competitive effects for 
rival companies. 
Our primary focus is to examine the underlying 
reason this negative valuation effect for announcing 
companies is transferred to industry competitors. A 
paper similar to ours in spirit is Ferris, Jayaraman, and 
Makhija (1997) who separate rival companies into 
two groups: those that file for bankruptcy themselves 
over the subsequent three years, and those that do not. 
Their premise is that at the original announcement, 
the market makes a prediction of the likelihood of 
future bankruptcy for the rival companies. The 
authors then use the actual reported bankruptcies over 
the subsequent three years as an indicator variable for 
the market's prediction at the original Chapter 11 
filing date. Those companies the market predicts will 
fail (i.e., those that actually fail over the next three 
years) are expected to suffer declines in value due to 
the contagion effect, while those predicted to continue 
operations (i.e., those that do not fail over the next 
three years) are expected to gain in value due to the 
competitive effect. Similar to Lang and Stulz, Ferris, 
Jayaraman, and Makhija report a significant average 
announcement effect of -0.56 percent for their full 
sample over the three days surrounding the filing. 
  
 
However, when they split the sample based on their 
prediction criterion, the equity of companies that 
subsequently file drop an average of -4.68 percent in 
value, while the equity of those that do not 
subsequently file drop - 0.49 percent. Since both 
numbers are statistically significant, they conclude 
that the contagion effect dominates the competitive 
effect even for those companies predicted to remain 
viable over the next three years. 
Although the equity of both groups in the Ferris, 
Jayaraman, and Makhija sample show statistically 
significant declines in value, the magnitude of the 
difference in average revaluations is consistent with 
the idea that market expectations for future 
bankruptcy affect current announcement period 
returns. However, their proxy for market expectations, 
i.e., whether the firm actually declares bankruptcy 
over the subsequent three years or not, is not available 
a priori. We hypothesize that rather than making 
yes/no predictions of future bankruptcy for each rival, 
market participants simply revise their estimates of 
future cash flows. Unexpected decreases in expected 
future cash flows due to the new information should 
produce negative changes in firm values. Thus our 
primary question is the following: Does a bankruptcy 
filing by a firm affect the expected future cash flows 
of industry rivals? We use changes in analysts' 
earnings forecasts to indicate changes in the market's 
expected future cash flows for these companies. If 
earnings forecasts for rival companies are revised 
after a bankruptcy filing then the equity values of 
those companies would be expected to change as well. 
Our results support our hypothesis. But first, 
similar to Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992), we find 
stock market reactions for our sample of 183 
companies filing a bankruptcy petition that average -
28.83% for the three days surrounding the 
announcement. In addition, we find results that 
support both Lang and Stulz (1992) and Ferris, 
Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997). For our portfolio 
comprised of 3,250 rival companies representing 121 
different industries we find significantly negative 
stock price reactions that average -0.51 percent. Our 
contribution, however, is an analysis of abnormal 
earnings forecast revisions. We find these revisions to 
be both negative and significant for rivals of failed 
companies. This finding is consistent with our 
hypothesis that the transfer of negative information 
from filing companies to their rivals is due to a 
decrease in expected future cash flows, a change in 
expectation created by new information regarding the 
entire industry provided by the bankruptcy 
announcement of a single member therein. Finally, we 
use regression analysis to formally test for a 
significant relation between the market reactions and 
earnings forecast revisions of individual rival 
companies. The negative forecast revisions for rivals, 
their respective market reactions, and our cross-
sectional regression results showing a positive and 
significant relation between the two, are consistent 
with our hypothesis that the contagion effect is 
transmitted from filing companies to rivals through 
revisions in rivals' future cash flows, revisions that 
were made as a result of the original Chapter 11 
filing. 
 
Sample selection 
 
We compiled our sample of companies filing for 
bankruptcy primarily through a search of the 
Lexis/Nexus files. Secondary sources include the 
Wall Street Journal Index, and information obtained 
from both Indepth Data Corporation and New 
Generation Research Company. Our sample 
companies filed for bankruptcy between October 1, 
1979 (the date the Bankruptcy Reform Act was 
implemented) and December 31, 1994. To be 
included in the final sample, we require sufficient data 
in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
data files. The resulting sample of Chapter 11 filing 
companies includes 183 companies operating in 121 
different four-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes. Table 1 presents a time series of the 
sample of filing companies and shows that the mid-
1980s was a time of few failures, while the rate of 
firm failure steadily increased during the early 1990s. 
The top half of table 2 presents descriptive statistics 
for the filing companies. The mean and median 
market values of equity of the 183 filing companies 
are $65.8 million and $12.5 million, respectively, with 
a standard deviation of $452.4 million. Apparently, 
the market value of filing companies is relatively 
small as might be expected of companies filing 
bankruptcy.  
An analysis of intra-industry effects of Chapter 
11 filings requires, by definition, data from the filing 
company's industry rivals. Following Lang and Stulz 
(1992), we define a filing company's industry rivals as 
all companies with the same four-digit SIC code. In 
order to qualify for our sample of rivals a company 
must have sufficient stock return data, but in addition, 
it must have sufficient earnings forecast data in the 
Institutional Brokers Estimation System (IBES) 
earnings forecast database for the 25 months 
surrounding the Chapter 11 filing. Previous studies 
have shown that the IBES database can contain errors. 
Following Ederington and Goh (1998), we eliminate a 
firm from our sample if its earnings forecast revision 
(defined below) is more than five standard deviations 
from the overall mean over all firms in the IBES 
database for any given month. After the initial round 
of data eliminations, the standard deviation is 
recalculated and again firms with observations outside 
five standard deviations are eliminated. After 
applying these various requirements our final sample 
of rivals includes 3,250 rivals in those same 121 
industries. The bottom half of table 2 reports 
summary statistics for the rival companies indicating 
that they are very similar in size to the filing 
companies. Their mean and median market value of 
  
 
equity is $60.45 million and $11.31 million, 
respectively, with a standard deviation of $265.16, 
about half that of the filing companies. In addition, 
the mean and median number of rivals competing 
with each filing company is 17.75 rivals and 6 rivals, 
respectively, with a range from one rival in one of the 
four-digit industries to 210 rivals in another industry. 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of bankruptcy filings by year 
 
Year Number of filings 
1980 6 
1981 6 
1982 16 
1983 12 
1984 3 
1985 2 
1986 0 
1987 3 
1988 3 
1989 10 
1990 12 
1991 37 
1992 26 
1993 23 
1994 24 
Total 183 
 
Filing firms are a sample of 183 companies that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection between October 1, 1979, and 
December 31, 1994. 
 
Stock Market Reaction 
 
We compute standardized abnormal returns following 
Patel (1976) as modified by Mikkelson and Partch 
(1988). Day 0 is defined as the date the bankruptcy 
petition is filed with the courts. The abnormal returns 
are the difference between the actual return and an 
expected return generated by the market model. We 
estimate the parameters for the market model using 
daily returns data from day t-251 to day t-505 (We 
use this estimation period to prevent biased test 
results since we look at the cumulative abnormal 
returns in the pre-filing period from 250 days to 31 
days prior to the filing.). Abnormal returns are 
generated for both the filing companies and an 
equally weighted portfolio of rival companies. 
Finally, we compute a Z- statistic and use it to test for 
statistical significance of standardized abnormal 
returns and cumulative standard abnormal returns 
(CAR). 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of firms filing Chapter 11 and their industry rivals 
 
Filing Firms: 
Mean market value of filing firms 
Median market value of filing firms 
Standard Deviation of market value of filing firms 
 
$65.80 million  
$12.46 million  
$452.38 million 
Rival Firms: 
Mean market value of rival firms 
Median market value of rival firms 
Standard deviation of market value of rival firms 
 
$60.45 million  
$11.31 million  
$265.16 million 
Mean number of rivals per event  
Median number of rivals per event  
Minimum number of rivals per event  
Maximum number of rivals per event 
17.75 rivals  
6 rivals  
1 rivals  
210 rivals 
 
Filing firms are a sample of 183 companies that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection between October 1, 1979, and 
December 31, 1994. Rival firms are the 3,250 companies whose four-digit primary Standard Industrial Classification code is 
the same as that of the filing firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3 reports the stock market reaction to a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing for both the filing 
companies and their rivals. Consistent with earlier 
studies, we observe a large and significant negative 
stock market reaction to announcements of a 
bankruptcy filing for the filing companies. The three-
day CAR (-1 to +1) for the full sample of 183 filing 
companies is -28.83 percent with z = - 43.79. 
Moreover, 78 percent of the abnormal returns over 
this three-day period are negative, which is 
significantly different from the null hypothesis of 50 
percent. Clearly, as shown in previous studies, the 
market views bankruptcy announcements as important 
informational events for the filing companies. 
 
Table 3. Effects of Chapter 11 filings on both the filing and rival firms' stock prices 
 
Day AAR 
% 
z-statistic Percent 
Positive 
z-statistic AAR 
% 
z-statistic Percent 
Positive 
z-statistic 
-10 -2.60 -8.04*** 39% -1.95* -0.03 -0.76 45% -0.57 
-9 -1.80 -6.33*** 37% -2.38** -0.02 -0.86 43% -2.34** 
-8 -1.20 -0.75 41% -1.29 -0.30 -3.25*** 42% -2 70*** 
-7 0.60 0.61 45% -0.43 -0.09 -1.11 46% 0.26 
-6 -0.69 -2.45** 46% 0.03 -0.04 -1.08 43% -2.20** 
-5 -1.23 -3.82*** 42% -1.12 0.09 1.43 48% 1.28 
-4 -3.06 -7.84*** 34% -3.39*** -0.20 -0.54 46% 0.15 
-3 -1.81 -5.68*** 41% -1.44 -0.10 -1.05 46% -0.07 
-2 -2.71 -8.84*** 34% -3 14*** -0.31 -1.72* 44% -1.42 
-1 -0.68 -0.55 40% -1.53 -0.11 -1.70* 46% 0.1 
0 -13.38 -40.50*** 28% -4.65*** -0.05 -0.86 45% -0.46 
1 -14.77 -35.24*** 33% -3.43*** -0.36 -3.41*** 45% -0.73 
2 3.89 13.29*** 46% -0.13 0.10 0.05 45% -1.01 
3 4.51 13.35*** 47% 0.2 -0.15 -0.87 44% -1.48 
4 1.73 4.52*** 46% -0.12 0.03 -0.13 47% 0.54 
5 0.88 0.5 48% 0.35 -0.02 -1.35 46% -0.15 
6 3.34 7.88*** 53% 1.55 -0.29 -2.22** 47% 0.7 
7 0.98 6.64*** 48% 0.5 0.05 1.59 44% -1.48 
8 1.45 3.85*** 47% 0.27 -0.26 -2.00** 45% -0.46 
9 0.64 2.50** 54% 1.79* -0.22 -1.72* 45% -0.74 
10 -3.10 -7.73*** 41% -1.22 0.39 2.48** 48% 1.30 
Cumulative         
Returns         
-31,-250 -15.30 -6.56*** 36% -2 75*** -4.83 -5.01*** 48% 1.36 
-1,1 -28.83 -43.79*** 22% -6 11*** -0.51 -3.44*** 42% -3 21*** 
31,250 107.31 13.20*** 67% 4.78*** -7.32 -5.31*** 45% -0.54 
 
*** Indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  
** Indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  
* Indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
We estimate average abnormal returns based on the market model around the announcement day (Day 0) of chapter 11 
filings. The market model is estimated over the (-251,-505) period. The sample includes 183 firms filing for Chapter 11 
protection from creditors between October 1, 1980, and December 31, 1994, and 3,250 rival firms. 
 
The equally weighted portfolio of rival 
companies has an average three-day CAR that equals 
-0.51 percent with z = -3.34. In addition, 58 percent of 
the abnormal returns over this period are negative, 
which is significantly different from 50 percent. 
These finding for the rival companies is similar to 
both Lang and Stulz, who report a - 1.07 percent 
reaction over the eleven days surrounding the filing, 
and Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija, who report a -
0.56 percent reaction over the same three-day event 
window as ours, both of which have different sample 
periods. Due to their magnitude, these average 
cumulative abnormal stock returns for rival 
companies do not appear to be economically 
  
 
significant in percentage terms, but as pointed out by 
Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija, they are significant 
in dollar terms. This is because the sum of the equity 
value of the competitors is much larger than that of 
the companies filing for bankruptcy. In fact, Ferris, et 
al, report that for their sample the competitor portfolio 
loses $3.32 of equity value on average for every 
dollar of equity value lost by the bankrupt companies. 
These event study findings indicate that 
bankruptcy filings are bad news, on average, for both 
the companies making the filing and their industry 
rivals. We now turn our focus to determining how this 
bad news is transmitted to the rivals hypothesizing 
that the transfer of bad news is made through a 
revision of the cash flow estimations of the rivals 
upon the bankruptcy filing. The next section presents 
our methodology for testing this hypothesis, and the 
results of that test. 
 
Abnormal Earnings Forecast Revisions 
 
To judge whether or not the market reaction for rival 
companies is due to changes in expected cash flow we 
need a proxy for those expectations. Earnings analysts 
help set the market's initial level of expected cash 
flows with their initial forecasts of future earnings. 
Similarly, revisions in analyst's forecasts help to reset 
cash flow expectations to some new level. We use 
reported earnings forecast revisions subsequent to a 
bankruptcy filing as a proxy for changes in the 
market's expectations of future cash flow from the 
rival companies. Significant earnings revisions after a 
filing are consistent with the hypothesis that bad news 
for bankrupt companies is transferred to their rivals 
through a change in the market's cash flow 
expectations for those companies. 
Following Brous (1992), we measure earnings 
forecast revisions (FR) using the following equation: 
 
FR i,t = [(F i,t – F i,t-1 )/ Pi] × 100 (1) 
 
where Fi,t is the median analyst earnings 
forecast in month t for the annual earnings per share 
of firm i for the current fiscal year, and Pi is the stock 
price for firm i six months prior to the bankruptcy 
filing 
Mean values of FR are reported in column two 
of table 4 from six months before, through six months 
after the filings, as well as cumulated forecast 
revisions in the bottom two rows, while their t-
statistics are in column three. As shown there, large 
and significant negative revisions in analysts' earnings 
forecasts are observed in every month both prior to 
and after Chapter 11 filings for rivals of filing 
companies. 
 
Table 4. Abnormal earnings forecast revisions for rival firms 
 
Month FR T AFR t 
-6 -0.245 -6.70*** -0.025 -0.79 
-5 -0.318 -7 00*** -0.127 -2.72*** 
-4 -0.345 -7 27*** -0.149 -3.13*** 
-3 -0.398 -7.68*** -0.214 -4.09*** 
-2 -0.296 -5.80*** -0.025 -0.56 
-1 -0.282 -7 27*** -0.035 -0.90 
0 -0.286 -6.82*** -0.087 -2.19** 
1 -0.232 -6.21*** 0.002 0.06 
2 -0.197 -5.17*** 0.012 0.32 
3 -0.285 -6.88*** -0.094 -2.22** 
4 -0.241 -5.67*** -0.051 -1.27 
5 -0.240 -4.93*** -0.040 -0.87 
6 -0.176 -4.56*** 0.051 1.36 
Cumulative     
Forecast Revisions    
-6,-1 -1.884 -12.18*** -0.575 -4.89*** 
0,5 -1.436 -11.03*** -0.218 -2.17** 
 
*** Indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  
** Indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  
* Indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
For our sample of 3,250 rival companies, we define the forecast revision, FR for Month t as the mean of analysts' forecasts 
reported in the IBES database in month t less the mean of analysts' forecast in month t-1, scaled by stock price at the end of 
the month preceding the chapter 11 filing announcement. We define the adjusted forecast revision, AFR for month t as the 
scaled forecast revision for month t less the expected forecast revision for month t. The t statistics test the hypothesis that the 
mean analysts' earnings forecast revision is different from 0. 
 
 
 
  
 
Unadjusted forecast revisions such as these, 
however, are biased. O'Brien (1988) shows that 
earnings forecasts systematically decrease month after 
month until the actual earnings are announced by the 
firm. This implies that forecasters are systematically 
over optimistic when making their first earnings 
forecast for a company, and that they never fully 
correct for that over optimism. A different type of 
bias in unadjusted forecast revisions is reported by 
Brous (1992) who shows that the median monthly 
earnings forecast revisions for a specific company 
across all analysts covering that company tend to be 
serially correlated. That is, if favorable new 
information arrives that leads to an upward revision in 
a company's average earnings forecast, for example, 
that average will tend to continue to rise in future 
months. Brous argues that this serial correlation is due 
to the fact that analysts typically update their forecasts 
for any specific company only every four to five 
months. That is, in any given month only about 20 
percent of forecasts are updated. To test our 
hypothesis for intra-industry information transfer 
effects of bankruptcy filings, we need a measure of 
forecast revisions after correcting for these two 
effects. This measure we call the abnormal earnings 
forecast revision (AFR). 
We follow the methodology of Caton and Goh 
(2003), which is a modified version of that employed 
by Ederington and Goh and Brous, to isolate surprise 
forecast revisions. We start by randomly choosing 
500 companies from the IBES database. Then, for 
each company we randomly select a 25-month period 
between January 1984 and December 1990. Finally, 
we pool the resulting data and estimate the following 
equation:  
 
Fr i,t = -.093 + .085 FR i,t-1 + .085 FR i,t-2 + .081 
FR i,t-3 + .072 FR i,t-4 + .058 FR i, t-5 + 
.040 FR i, t-6 + u i,t 
(2) 
 
The negative intercept in this equation, -.093, is 
consistent with the finding by O'Brien that absent new 
information, analysts tend to reduce their forecasts 
over time. For instance, for a firm with a P/E ratio of 
20, the negative intercept implies an average revision 
of -1.86 percent (20 x .093% ) every month. The 
positive coefficients on the lagged forecast revisions 
are consistent with Brouse's finding that revisions in 
the median forecast tend to be followed by further 
revisions of the same sign as more analysts update 
their forecasts. For instance, the coefficients for the 
FRi;t-i , for all i = 1-6, indicate that a doubling of the 
median forecast one month tends to be followed by an 
increase of about 8.5 percent the following month, 8.5 
percent two months hence, 8.1 percent three months 
later, and so on. 
Using the parameters from equation 2 and each 
firm's past values of FR, we calculate the expected 
forecast revision, E(FRi,t), for each month t. We then 
define the abnormal earnings forecast revision for 
month t, AFRi,t, as the difference between the actual 
revision in the consensus forecast in month t and its 
expected forecast revision calculated as outlined 
above. Specifically: 
 
AFR i,t = FR i,t - E(FR i,t) (3) 
 
Columns four and five of table 4 presents the 
abnormal earnings forecast revisions for the rivals of 
companies filing for bankruptcy. First note the 
significant negative abnormal forecast revision of -
0.087 in month zero, the Chapter 11 filing month. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis that Chapter 11 
filing produces changes in the market's cash flow 
expectaions for rivals which then lead to abnormal 
equity returns. As mentioned above, Brouse reports 
that because analysts cover more companies than they 
can updated in any given month, that it may take up to 
six months for news to be fully reflected in the 
forecasts of all analysts' following a particular 
compmany. For this reason we cumulate the abnormal 
forecast revisions for the six months from the filing 
month to month +5. The mean cumulative abnormal 
forecast revision over this period is -0.218, which is 
statistically significant below the 5 percent level. This 
result is consistent with the result for the filing month 
itself. That is, if earnings expectations do indeed 
proxy for expected future cash flow, the sudden 
decrease in expected cash flow resulting from a 
Chapter 11 filing may lead to the negative abnormal 
equity returns found by us, Lang and Stulz (1992), 
and Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997). 
 
Cross-sectional regression 
 
We formally test for a relation between abnormal 
earnings forecast revisions and changes in market 
values of equity using regression analysis. 
Specifically, we regress the abnormal stock returns 
cumulated over the three-day period surrounding the 
bankruptcy filing on the abnormal forecast revisions 
cumulated over the six-month period from month 0 
through month 5. The six- month cumulation should 
capture all the change in earnings expectations caused 
by the filing. In addition, we control for other firm-
specific information that could affect earnings 
forecast revisions. Hertzel and Jain (1991) and Hertzel 
and Rees (1998) both indicate that because of the 
serial correlation inherent in the IBES data, there is 
potential for a great deal of contaminating information 
since forecast revisions could reflect information 
released either months prior to or after the bankruptcy 
filing. In order to control for such firm-specific 
information, we include two variables in the cross-
sectional regression models, the pre-announcement 
cumulative abnormal return over the interval from 
Day -250 to Day -31, and the post-announcement 
cumulative abnormal return over the interval from 
Day +31 to Day +250. These two variables should 
  
 
capture any other firm-specific information that might 
cause analysts to revise their earnings forecasts. 
Results for the cross-sectional regression 
analysis are presented in table 5 and suggest that the 
stock market reaction is strongly related to abnormal 
earnings forecast revisions. The regression coefficient 
is positive and with a t-statistic of 3.34 is significant 
below the 1 percent level. This is consistent with our 
hypothesis that the negative stock market reaction 
found by Lang and Stulz (1992), Ferris, Jayaraman, 
and Makija (1997) , and shown in table 3 herein, may 
be due to negative revisions in cash flow expectations. 
That is, the average contagion effect is the result of an 
industry-wide average reduction in cash flow 
expectations that are a result of the Chapter 11 filing. 
 
Table 5. Cross-sectional analysis of rival firms' cumulative abnormal forecast revisions on their cumulative 
abnormal returns 
Independent variables Coefficient t-statistic 
Cumulative abnormal forecast revision 0.241 3.34*** 
Pre-announcement abnormal return 0.008 2.45** 
Pre-announcement abnormal return  0.002 0.51 
 
*** Indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
** Indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  
* Indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper provides evidence that the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition reflects the release of new 
information that affects the market values of rival 
companies. As documented elsewhere, the 
information contained in the filing comes as a surprise 
to the market as evidenced by the negative stock price 
reaction for rivals. We extend the analysis by looking 
more deeply at how this negative information is 
transferred from the filing company to its rivals. We 
find significant negative abnormal earnings forecast 
revisions for filing companies' industry rivals. 
Furthermore, the results of a cross-sectional 
regression analysis show a significant positive 
relation between abnormal stock price reactions and 
abnormal cumulative forecast revisions for rival 
companies, thus formally confirming a positive 
relation between the two. These findings are 
consistent with our hypothesis that a Chapter 1 filing 
produces a negative effect on the market's expected 
future cash flows for rival companies that leads to 
negative stock returns. 
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